

# ExpressVPN ISAE (UK) 3000 Type I Independent Assurance Report on Internal Controls

Controls system applicable to TrustedServer services undertaken by ExpressVPN

As of 1 September 2022



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# 1.Independent assurance report on internal controls

## **Private & confidential**

The Directors
Express Technologies Limited
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27 September 2022

**Dear Directors** 

## ISAE (UK) 3000 Type I Independent Assurance Report on Internal Controls

In accordance with our engagement letter dated 17 June 2022 and subsequent variation letter dated 8 September 2022 (together, our "Engagement Letter"), we have examined the accompanying description at pages 9-18 of the controls in place at the company called Express Technologies Limited ("ExpressVPN") and carried out procedures to enable us to form an independent opinion on whether the ExpressVPN's management has fairly described its controls system applicable to the TrustedServer services provided to ExpressVPN's customers as at 1 September 2022 (the "Description"), and on the suitability of the design of controls to achieve the related control objectives stated in the Description. Our opinion is set out below and should be read and considered in conjunction with this report in full.

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## **ExpressVPN's Management's Responsibilities**

In this report, references to ExpressVPN's "management" means the directors of ExpressVPN and those employees to whom the directors of ExpressVPN have properly delegated day-to-day conduct over matters for which the directors of ExpressVPN retain ultimate responsibility.

Management of ExpressVPN is responsible for (1) preparing its statement at pages 7-8 and describing in the Description its controls system applicable to the TrustedServer services provided to ExpressVPN's customers, (2) having a reasonable basis for its statement, (3) selecting the criteria to be used and stating them in the statement, (4) specifying the control objectives and stating them in the Description, and (5) identifying the risks that threaten the achievement of the control objectives and designing, implementing, and documenting controls that are suitably designed and operating effectively to provide reasonable assurance that the controls objectives stated in the Description will be achieved.

## **KPMG's Responsibilities**

Our responsibility is to express an independent opinion to ExpressVPN, based on the procedures performed and evidence obtained, as to whether (1) ExpressVPN's management's Description fairly presents the controls system that was designed and implemented as at 1 September 2022 and the aspects of the controls that may be relevant to a customer using ExpressVPN's TrustedServer services, and (2) the controls included in the Description were suitably designed as at 1 September 2022 to provide reasonable assurance that the control objectives specified would be achieved if the described controls were operating effectively. The criteria we used to form our judgements are the criteria used by management in making the Description, and are set out on page 7-8.

## Framework applied

We conducted our engagement in accordance with International Standard on Assurance Engagements (UK) 3000: Assurance Engagements other than Audits or Reviews of Historical Financial Information, issued by the Financial Reporting Council. That standard requires that we obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence on which to base our opinion.



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## **Our Independence and Quality Control**

We comply with the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales ("ICAEW") Code of Ethics which includes independence, and other requirements founded on fundamental principles of integrity, objectivity, professional competence and due care, confidentiality and professional behaviour, that are at least as demanding as the applicable provisions of the IESBA Code of Ethics. We apply International Standard on Quality Control (UK) 1 Quality Control for Firms that Perform Audits and Reviews of Financial Statements, and other Assurance and Related Services Engagements and accordingly we maintain a comprehensive system of quality control including documented policies and procedures regarding compliance with ethical requirements, professional standards and applicable legal and regulatory requirements.

## Scope of work

An assurance engagement to report on the Description and design of controls at a company involves planning and performing procedures to obtain sufficient appropriate evidence about the presentation of the Description of the controls system applicable to the TrustedServer services provided to ExpressVPN's customers, and suitability of the design of those controls. The procedures selected depend on our judgment, including the assessment of the risks that the Description is not fairly presented, and that controls are not suitably designed to achieve the related control objectives stated in the Description if the controls were operating effectively. An assurance engagement of this type also includes evaluating the overall presentation of the Description, the suitability of the control objectives stated therein, and the suitability of the criteria specified by the company.

We did not perform any procedures regarding the operating effectiveness of controls included in the Description and, accordingly, do not express an opinion thereon.

We believe that the evidence we have obtained is sufficient and appropriate to provide a basis for our opinion.

## **Limitations of Controls at a Company**

ExpressVPN's management's Description is prepared to meet the common needs of a broad range of customers using ExpressVPN's TrustedServer services and may not, therefore, include every aspect of the system that each individual customer may consider important in



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their own particular circumstances. Also, because of their nature, controls at the company may not prevent or detect all errors or omissions in the provision of the TrustedServer service provided to ExpressVPN's customers. Also, the projection of any evaluation of effectiveness to future periods is subject to the risk that controls at the company may become inadequate or fail.

## **Opinion**

Our opinion has been formed on the basis of the matters outlined in this report. In our opinion, in all material respects:

- (a) The Description fairly presents the TrustedServer services system provided to ExpressVPN's customers as designed and implemented as at 1 September 2022; and
- (b) The controls related to the control objectives stated in the Description were suitably designed as at 1 September 2022.

## **Additional Information**

The information provided on pages 35-36 of this report is presented by ExpressVPN to provide additional information and is not a part of ExpressVPN's management's Description of its controls system in operation. This information has not been subjected to the procedures applied in the examination of the Description of controls applicable to the TrustedServer services provided to ExpressVPN's customers, and accordingly, we express no opinion on it.

## **About this report including disclosure**

This report is made to and has been prepared solely for ExpressVPN on the terms agreed and recorded in our Engagement Letter. This report was designed to meet the agreed requirements of ExpressVPN and particular features of our engagement determined by ExpressVPN's needs at the time. This report is confidential and is released on the basis that it shall not be copied, referred to or disclosed, in whole or in part, save as permitted by our Engagement Letter, without our prior written consent.

We have consented to its disclosure to "User Entities", being ExpressVPN's customers via their customer accounts on ExpressVPN's website, the independent auditors of ExpressVPN, and prospective customers of ExpressVPN.



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By customers we mean, clients of ExpressVPN who have signed contracts in place as users of the TrustedServer services, which are the subject of this report. By prospective customers, we mean potential clients of ExpressVPN who are considering becoming users of the TrustedServer services which are the subject of this report and for whom a signed contract is not yet in place.

Our consent has been given without in any way or on any basis affecting our responsibility or giving rise to any duty or liability being accepted or assumed by or imposed on us to any party except ExpressVPN. We have consented to enable ExpressVPN to demonstrate, and such User Entities to verify, that an independent assurance report has been commissioned by ExpressVPN and issued in connection with the controls of ExpressVPN.

## **Intended Users and Purpose**

This report and description of tests of controls and results on pages 19-34 are only to be disclosed to User Entities who have a sufficient understanding to enable them to consider the matters stated including the basis of our consent to disclosure and their ability to rely on this report. This report is not to be used by anyone other than these specified parties.

This report does not restrict use by User Entities on the basis that those User Entities remain responsible for their own decisions and consideration of this report and for evaluating the evidence presented by our report and for determining its effect on their usage of ExpressVPN's TrustedServer services.

Any party other than ExpressVPN who obtains access to this report or a copy and chooses to use and rely on this report (or any part of it) will therefore do so at its own risk. To the fullest extent permitted by law, we do not accept or assume responsibility to anyone other than ExpressVPN, for our work, for this report, or for the opinions we have formed.

Yours faithfully

DocuSigned by:

KPMG LLP

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# 2. Management Statement

We have prepared the description of ExpressVPN's TrustedServer services provided to ExpressVPN's customers ("Description") as at 1 September 2022. The Description is intended to provide customers, who have a sufficient understanding to consider the Description, with information about the TrustedServer services particularly system controls intended to achieve the company's service commitments and system requirements relating to its Privacy Policy. We confirm that:

- (a) The accompanying Description at pages 9-18 fairly presents the controls system applicable to the TrustedServer services provided to ExpressVPN's customers as at 1 September 2022. The criteria used in making this statement were that the accompanying Description:
  - Presents how the system was designed and implemented, including:
    - The types of services provided:
    - The components of the controls system ("system") used to provide the services:
      - Software: the programs and operating software of the system (systems, applications, and utilities);
      - o People: the personnel involved in the operation and use of the system (developers, operators, users, and managers);
      - o Procedures: the automated and manual procedures involved in the operation of the system; and
      - Data: the information used and supported by the system (transaction streams, files, databases, and tables).
    - The boundaries or aspects of the system covered by the Description;
    - How the system captures and addresses significant events and conditions;
    - Relevant control objectives and controls designed to achieve those objectives;
    - Other aspects of our control environment, risk assessment process, information system (including the related business processes) and communication, control activities and monitoring controls that were relevant to provision of the TrustedServer service.
  - Does not omit or distort information relevant to the scope of the system being (ii) described, while acknowledging that the Description is prepared to meet the common needs of a broad range of customers using ExpressVPN's TrustedServer services and may not, therefore, include every aspect of the



system that each individual customer may consider important in its own particular circumstances.

- (b) The controls related to the control objectives stated in the accompanying Description were suitably designed as at 1 September 2022. The criteria used in making this statement were that:
  - The risks that threatened achievement of the control objectives stated in the description were identified; and
  - The identified controls would, if operated as described, provide reasonable (ii) assurance that those risks did not prevent the stated control objectives from being achieved.

DocuSigned by: Aaron Engel —A3F2356A8D8A481... Aaron Engel Head of Cyber Security 27 September 2022

## 3. Management's System Description

The following section describes:

- ExpressVPN's service offering
- 2. ExpressVPN's Privacy Policy as it relates to its VPN service
- 3. ExpressVPN TrustedServer technology
- 4. How ExpressVPN operates in compliance with its Privacy Policy

## 3.1. Background

Founded in 2009, ExpressVPN is one of the world's largest providers of VPN services, enabling users to protect their privacy and security online with just a few clicks. The company's award-winning software for Windows, Mac, iOS, Android, Linux, routers, and browsers provides strong encryptions and leak proofing while securing user information. With servers across 94 countries, ExpressVPN provides a fast connection wherever users are and offers uncensored access to sites and services from around the world. To learn more about ExpressVPN's privacy and security solutions, visit ExpressVPN's website.

## 3.2. Overview

ExpressVPN is committed to protecting our customers' privacy. Our privacy policy, which is publicly available, explains what information we collect, what we don't collect, and how we collect, use, and store information. ExpressVPN's guiding principle toward data collection is to collect only the minimal data required to operate a reliable, privacy-focused VPN service at scale.

## 3.3. Scope of the report

This report provides detailed descriptions of how our system is implemented, and describes a comprehensive set of verifiable controls that ExpressVPN has developed to uphold our Privacy Policy. These controls cover the full software development lifecycle to verify that code we write, build and deploy maintains its integrity, describes the operational constraints

that are in place to help ensure that this remains true throughout TrustedServer's operational lifecycle, and that it is not possible for any logs to be collected for user activity.

#### 3.4. **Privacy Policy**

Excerpts of the relevant sections from the ExpressVPN Privacy Policy, located on ExpressVPN's website:

ExpressVPN is committed to protecting your privacy. We want you to understand what information (including Personal Data) we collect in connection with your use of our Services and/or access to our Site; for what purpose such information is collected; how we collect, use, and store such information; to whom it may be disclosed; and how you can exercise your rights and access your information, verify its accuracy, correct and/or have it erased. Equally, we want you to know what information we do not collect under any circumstances.

Our guiding principle toward data collection is to collect only the minimal data required to operate world-class Services at scale. We designed our systems (and strive to constantly improve them) to not have sensitive data about our customers. We cannot disclose, misuse, or abuse, even when compelled, data that we do not possess. We do not collect logs of your activity, including no logging of browsing history, traffic destination, data content, or DNS queries. We also never store connection logs, meaning no logs of your IP address, your outgoing VPN IP address, connection timestamp, or session duration.

Usage Statistics Data and App Diagnostic Data never include any sensitive information, in line with our overall commitment to never logging browsing history, traffic destination, data content, IP addresses, or DNS queries.

Our principle of minimal data collection means that:

- We do not know which user ever accessed a particular website or service.
- We do not know which user was connected to the VPN at a specific time or which VPN server IP addresses they used.
- We do not know the set of original IP addresses of any given user's computer.

Should anyone try to compel ExpressVPN to release user information based on any of the above, we cannot supply this information because the data does not exist.

## Apps and Apps versions

We collect information related to which Apps and Apps version(s) you have activated in order to use our Services. Knowing your current version of the Apps allows our Support Team to troubleshoot technical issues you may encounter.

### Successful connection

We collect information about whether you have successfully established a VPN connection on a particular day (but not a specific time of the day), to which VPN location (but not your assigned outgoing IP address), and from which country/ISP (but not your source IP address). This minimal information assists us in providing technical support, such as identifying connection problems, providing country-specific advice about how to best use our Services, enabling ExpressVPN engineers to identify and fix network issues.

## Aggregate sum of data transferred (in MB)

We collect information regarding the total sum of data transferred by a given user. Although we provide unlimited data transfer, if we notice that a single user pushes more traffic than thousands of others combined, thereby affecting the quality of Services for other Express VPN users, we may contact that user for an explanation.


## Usage Statistics Data summary

In summary, we collect minimal usage statistics to maintain our quality of service. We may know, for example, that our customer John had connected to our New York VPN location on Tuesday and transferred an aggregate of 823 MB of data across a 24-hour period. John can't be uniquely identified as responsible for any specific online behavior because his usage pattern overlaps with thousands of other ExpressVPN customers who also connected to the same location on the same day.

We've engineered our systems to categorically eliminate storage of sensitive data. We may know THAT a user has used ExpressVPN, but we are unable to single out the user and we never know HOW they have utilized our Service. We stand by our firm commitment to our users' privacy by not possessing any data related to a user's online activities.

#### 3.5. How ExpressVPN's servers comply with our Privacy Policy

## **System Overview**



Notes to explain the diagram above:

- 1. Only if the user chooses to use the ExpressVPN apps: The apps call Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) operated by ExpressVPN (See "Apps and Apps versions" in the Privacy Policy excerpts). If the user chooses to manually configure the Virtual Private Network (VPN) in their operating system, these API calls do not happen. The types of API calls are:
  - a. Authenticate the user, retrieve credentials to connect to the VPN, and discover the set of available VPN infrastructure. This generates an event saved to a database with the Operating System (OS) and app version used.
  - b. Check whether the user's license has reached its limit on the number of simultaneous connections. This system keeps counters of simultaneous connections per license only at the current moment in time. It does not keep historical records. Also, while an app is connected to the VPN, it sends a periodic heartbeat through the VPN to keep the simultaneous-connection counter accurate. Upon disconnect or absence of heartbeats, the counter resets within five minutes.

- 2. The user connects to VPN servers operated by ExpressVPN (See "Successful connection" in the Privacy Policy excerpts).
  - a. Authentication is done with a username and password. Both credentials are generated randomly for each customer at the time of signup, and they are unrelated to the credentials used to login to the ExpressVPN website. Each VPN server has a local copy of the authentication database and authorizes the user without making additional network calls.
  - b. The VPN servers are **designed and configured to prevent logging** of anything about what the user does with the VPN. No connection logs, no activity logs (even of Domain Name System (DNS) lookups), or other types of logs that would contradict our Privacy Policy.
- 3. The VPN server writes **exactly one** event **per connection**. The VPN server uses the user's IP address to make a GeoIP lookup using a locally stored GeoIP database. The event is sent to a database. The event does NOT include the user's IP address or the outgoing IP address that the server used to route the user's traffic. The fields in the event are (See "Successful connection" in the Privacy Policy excerpts):
  - a. the current date (not time).
  - b. a salted and hashed version of the VPN username (which itself is randomly generated, unrelated to the user's email address or other personally identifiable information) that performed the event.
  - c. the Country and Internet Service Provider (ISP) GeoIP attributes of the connection.
  - d. the aggregate amount of data transferred in and out through the VPN tunnel, in megabytes, for the now completed session. (See Aggregate sum of data transferred (in MB) in the privacy policy excerpts)
  - e. an ID representing the VPN location. This does not identify the specific server used, but rather the group of servers corresponding to the location that the user selected.
  - f. an ID representing the VPN protocol used, such as OpenVPN or Lightway.
- 4. On a recurring schedule, each VPN server downloads the latest configuration data files, including the authentication database and a specification of the server's expected configuration.
- 5. Each VPN server regularly sends operational infrastructure metrics to:
  - a. a cloud-hosted **Prometheus** database. This data does not contain any personally identifiable information (PII). They are operational metrics such as




- Central Processing Unit (CPU), Random Access Memory (RAM), network utilisation metrics, and the version-identifier of the TrustedServer image running on this server.
- b. a cloud-hosted **Icinga** infrastructure-monitoring system. This data does not contain any PII. They are uptime heartbeats commonly used in operating Linux servers.

## 3.5.1. TrustedServer Architecture

All ExpressVPN VPN servers are operated on the "ExpressVPN TrustedServer" RAM-only architecture as described below. This represents all users and traffic, both using the ExpressVPN applications and manual configuration. No other VPN server platform is available in the ExpressVPN service offering.

Our TrustedServer technology is built upon a Linux-based operating system. It utilizes a combination of open-source technologies, Ansible playbooks for Deployment, and in-house developed orchestration tooling to manage VPN servers end-to-end service lifecycle in an automated and secure manner.

The architecture broadly consists of the following:




## On an ExpressVPN TrustedServer:

- 1. The entire Operating System is defined as **code** in a **version-controlled** repository. These codebases have automated change management controls in place, which helps ensure a single developer acting alone cannot modify the source code.
- 2. The servers run in RAM only. The bootloader on the server hardware boots directly into a read-only ISO image that is built from our version-controlled codebase and digitally signed by ExpressVPN. The ISO contains the entire Debian operating system compiled by ExpressVPN as well as all applications in it. A server cannot boot without a valid signature on the ISO, which in turn validates that the content of the ISO is unchanged.
- 3. Within the booted OS, any files written to system locations are written to an OverlayFS that resides in memory only.
- 4. With every reboot, the servers reset themselves to their standardized state based on the read-only ISO image, therefore any data that might have accumulated during operations are lost.
- 5. The ISO image is generic. No server-specific configuration or secrets are shipped inside the ISO image. A separate "activator" validates the running OS before pushing or generating secrets.
- 6. No PII, such as user's IP addresses, are logged on the server, or exported from the server in any form.

## 3.5.2. TrustedServer Workflows

## **Code changes**



To help ensure that our servers remain compliant with our Privacy Policy, we follow workflows to protect ourselves from accidental or malicious changes. The key points are:

- 1. Everything running on TrustedServer, starting with the operating system on up, is defined in source code and stored in git. That source code is compiled into a single ISO that defines all code that will be on TrustedServer.
- 2. No one can push source-code changes to the production branch directly. Instead, changes are made in a feature branch.
- 3. All commits are cryptographically signed using a hardware-backed signing keys that are securely generated on the device, the public keys to which are validated against a version-controlled source of truth that is maintained by our internal IT team.
- 4. Automated unit tests include checks that verify that configuration remains in a nologging state. Tests automatically fail if code-coverage is below 95%. Failing tests automatically prevent the merging of code into the production branch.
- 5. Feature branches require review and approval from one or more reviewers, at least one of whom must be a Code Owner, before they can be merged into the production
- 6. With every change to the production branch, automated tests are run again.

This multi-person code review workflow policy is also defined in code, which is subjected to the same workflow.

## **Automatic Security Scanning**


Third-party dependencies included within the codebase are continually scanned for active security alerts Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) using automatic dependency vulnerability checking tools. The ability to merge code changes from a feature branch will be automatically disabled until any active security alerts are resolved.

## Reproducible Builds

TrustedServer employs the practice of Reproducible Builds for the Operating System and application stack that is shipped as an ISO image. We do this by building the OS image from the same source of truth (the source code) on at least two independently operated Build Systems, which both produce the final ISO image. These ISO images are then compared using cryptographic hashes of their contents to help ensure they are bit-for-bit identical.

The images being identical asserts that both build systems took identical source code, dependencies, operating system base, software versions, and configuration files and that they have not been modified throughout the build process.

This process protects TrustedServer against build pipeline attacks...



Once the TrustedServer OS image is verified reproducible, the ISO image is cryptographically signed for release by an engineering manager using a private key stored on a hardware-backed key. The source of truth for verified signing keys are

maintained in a version-controlled repository, itself having all of the above described protections.

The purpose of cryptographically signing at this stage is to achieve the following:

- 1. Signed The image has been verified reproducible.
- 2. Sealed The contents of the image have not been changed since signing.
- 3. Delivered The image can be shipped to our servers which can digitally verify the image has been delivered unaltered.

The signed TrustedServer image is then shipped to our Content Delivery Network (CDN), where the global fleet of VPN servers can perform automatic upgrades. These upgrades are managed by our global orchestration tooling, preventing customer impact during the upgrade cycle. This process repeats on a regular schedule.

## **Signature Verification**

The signature of the TrustedServer image is validated at multiple stages along the deployment pipeline, using multiple unique and version-controlled sources of truth. This helps ensure that no discrepancies make their way into TrustedServer through its lifecycle.

## Activation

Since no server or service-specific secrets are stored inside the TrustedServer ISO, we generate them on-server and/or push them from a secure source once the Operating System is running. That is performed by the **Activator**, an **external** service which is able to validate the security of the running TrustedServer instance before generating and pushing secrets.

Some entropy-related secrets are automatically generated on-server (such as Diffie-Hellman parameters for OpenVPN), and others are pushed to the server (such as per-server VPN keys and authentication credentials for downstream systems) once the system's integrity has been validated.

Upon the completion of activation, where a server enters "production" ready to pass user's traffic, remote access to the server via Secure Shell Protocol (SSH) is disabled by default. Neither the Activator nor ExpressVPN staff can access the server using SSH after this stage.

# 4. Control objectives, related controls and tests of design and implementation

#### 4.1. Test of the control environment

The control environment represents the collective effect of various elements in establishing, enhancing or mitigating the effectiveness of specific controls. Tests of the control environment included the following procedures, to the extent we considered necessary:

- 1) Reviews of ExpressVPN organisational structure, including policy statements, policies and the segregation of functional responsibilities within each team to carry out assigned activities;
- 2) Discussions with management, operations, administrative and other personnel who are responsible for developing, ensuring adherence to, and applying controls;
- 3) Observations of personnel in the performance of their assigned duties; and
- 4) Discussion with management regarding the risk, operational and compliance management process.

The control environment was considered in determining the nature, timing and extent of the testing of controls relevant to achievement of the control objectives.

#### 4.2. Description of tests performed

Tests performed to determine the design and implementation of the controls detailed in this section are described below:

Test Procedure	Description
Enquiries	Enquired of appropriate ExpressVPN personnel. Enquiries were used to obtain, among other things, knowledge and additional information about the control.
Inspection	Read documents, reports and electronic files that contain an indication of performance of the control. This includes, among other things, examining management reports, operational logs and other relevant documentation.
Observation	Observed the application of a specific control by ExpressVPN personnel. Observations are primarily performed where there is no documentary evidence of the implementation of the controls.

#### 4.3. Control objectives, related controls and tests performed

## 4.3.1. Control objective 1 – Logging of users' activity

Controls provide reasonable assurance that the ExpressVPN TrustedServer does not collect logs of users' activity, including no logging of browsing history, traffic destination, data content, DNS queries or specific connection logs.

Ref	Control activity specified by ExpressVPN	Tests performed by KPMG LLP	Results of testing
C1.1.1	User-facing services are configured to automatically prevent exposing internal state containing:  - users' activity; - traffic source and destination; - data content; - DNS queries via error; - output; or - outputting of log file.	On a selection of days, inspected the system configuration of a selected user-facing service and noted that it had been configured to automatically prevent exposing internal state containing:  - users' activity;  - traffic source and destination;  - data content;  - DNS queries via error;  - output; or  - outputting of log file.	No exceptions noted.
C1.1.2	Service managers for user-facing services are configured to automatically prevent leaked data from the process' error, output or logging facility from being logged, and send them instead to a special device (/dev/null) which discards the data.	On a selection of days, inspected the system configuration of a service manager for a selected user-facing service and noted that it had been configured to:  - automatically prevent leaked data from the process' error, output or logging facility from being logged; and - send them instead to a special device (/dev/null/) which discarded the data.	No exceptions noted.

C1.2.1	The TrustedServer operating system is configured to run only on an in-memory file system, OverlayFS such that files written to the root filesystem are allowed to exist in memory only and are lost on server reboot.	On a selection of days, inspected the configuration of the operating system and noted that it had been configured to run only on an inmemory file system, OverlayFS.  For a selected file written to the root filesystem, inspected the output of the server reboot and noted that files written to the root filesystem had existed in memory only and had been lost on server reboot.	No exceptions noted.
C1.3.1	Version control on the change management system is configured to automatically disable changes being pushed directly to production branches.	On a selection of days, inspected the configuration of version control on the change management system and noted that it had been configured to automatically disable changes being pushed directly to production branches.  For a selected change, inspected the change records on the change management system and noted that the system automatically disabled the change from being pushed directly to the production branch.	No exceptions noted.
C1.4.1	The change management system is configured to run continuous integration tests on code changes to validate that no logging configuration has been enabled. Version control on the change management system is configured to automatically disable merging of a code change to the production branch when the validation fails.	On a selection of days inspected the configuration of the change management system and noted that it had been configured to run continuous integration tests on code changes to validate that no logging configuration had been enabled.  On a selection of days, inspected the configuration of version control on the change management system and noted that it had been configured to automatically disable merging of the code change to the production branch when the validation failed.	No exceptions noted.

		For a selected change, inspected the change records on the change management system and noted that:  - continuous integration tests had been run on the change to validate that no logging configuration had been enabled; and - when the validation failed, the version control on the change management system disabled merging the change to the production branch.	
C1.4.2	The change management system is configured to automatically disable merging of the change to the production branch until a minimum of two people have reviewed and approved code changes in the form of Pull Requests, one of whom is a Code	On a selection of days, inspected the configuration on the change management system and noted that it had been configured to automatically disable merging of the change to the production branch until a minimum of two people had reviewed code changes in the form of Pull Requests, one of whom was a Code Owner.	No exceptions noted.
	Owner.	For a selected change, inspected the change record on the change management system and noted that:  - a minimum of two people had reviewed the code change in the form of a Pull Request, one of whom had been a Code Owner.  - merging of the change to the production branch had been automatically disabled until the change had been approved.	

C1.4.3	The change management system is configured to automatically disable merging of a change to the production branch if:  - the code reviewers for the change are not different from code contributors; or  - a code contributor is the sole reviewer, even where the contributor is the Code Owner.	On a selection of days, inspected the configuration of the change management system and noted that it had been configured to automatically disable merging of a change to the production branch if:  - the code reviewers are not different from the code contributors; or - the code contributor is the sole reviewer even where the contributor is the Code Owner.  For a selected change request, inspected the change record on the change management system and noted that:  - the code reviewers for the change had been different from the code contributors; - the code contributor had not been the sole reviewer; and - merging of the change to the production branch had been automatically disabled until the validation of the segregation of reviewers had passed.	No exceptions noted.
C1.4.4	The change management system is configured to only allow changes to the Code Owners group membership if a minimum of two people have reviewed and approved the change, one of whom is a Code Owner.	On a selection of days, inspected configuration of the changes to Code Owners group on the change management system and noted that it had been configured to only allow changes to the Code Owners group membership if a minimum of two people had reviewed and approved the change, one of whom was a Code Owner.	No exceptions noted.

C1.5.1	The change management system is configured to only allow changes to configuration of the version control system if the change is approved by a separate team, unrelated to TrustedServer, overseeing the security posture of ExpressVPN's source code repositories.	On a selection of days, inspected the configuration of the change management system and noted that it had been configured to only allow changes to configuration of the version control system if the change had been approved by a separate team that was unrelated to TrustedServer and had oversight of the security posture of ExpressVPN's source code repositories.	No exceptions noted.
C1.6.1	The TrustedServer OS image or boot process is configured to automatically fail verification steps for changes made to it such that the changed image is prevented from being used for production.	On a selection of days, inspected the configuration of the TrustedServer OS image or boot process and noted that it had been configured to automatically fail verification steps for changes made to it such that the changed image is prevented from being used for production.	No exceptions noted.
		For an attempted change to made to the TrustedServer OS image, inspected the results of the change the verification steps and noted that:  - the verification steps had failed; and - the changed image had been prevented from being used for production.	
C1.7.1	The configuration for TrustedServer VPN credentials only allows random, automatically generated username and password strings.	On a selection of days, inspected the configuration for TrustedServer VPN credentials and noted that it had been configured to only allow random, automatically generated username and password strings.	No exceptions noted.
		Inspected the creation of a TrustedServer VPN user and noted that credentials allowed to be used by the system had been random, automatically generated username and password strings.	

## 4.3.2. Control objective 2– Usage analytics data

Controls provide reasonable assurance that usage analytics data are collected in-line with ExpressVPN's privacy policy, including VPN location, aggregate data transfer per connection but not the source, or length of connection.

Ref	Control activity specified by ExpressVPN	Tests performed by KPMG LLP	Results of testing
C2.1.1	Guidelines for collection of usage analytics including VPN location, aggregate data transfer per connection but not the source, or length of connection is documented within the Privacy Policy as published on ExpressVPN's website.  The Privacy Policy is reviewed and approved for distribution by ExpressVPN's Chief Communications Officer, Legal Department, and Data Protection Officer on an annual basis at a minimum.	Inspected the Privacy Policy, ExpressVPN website and the email correspondence from approvers and noted that the Privacy Policy:  - contained guidelines for collection of usage analytics including VPN location, aggregate data transfer per connection but not the source, or length of connection; - had been published on ExpressVPN's website; and - had been reviewed and approved for distribution within the last twelve months by ExpressVPN's Chief Communications Officer, Legal Department, and Data Protection Officer.	No exceptions noted.
C2.1.2	Prior to the event leaving the server, the Usage Analytics system automatically verifies the schema of the generated event, filtering out invalid keys and values.  Valid keys and values are maintained by the TrustedServer team in version-controlled source code.	On a selection of days for a selected event submission, inspected the record in the Usage Analytics system and noted that prior to the event leaving the server, the Usage Analytics system had automatically verified the schema of the generated event, filtering out invalid keys and values.	No exceptions noted.

		On a selection of days, inspected the records in the version control system and noted that valid keys and values had been maintained by the TrustedServer team in version-controlled source code.	
C2.1.3	When a data set is received from the VPN servers by the analytics pipeline, automated schema validation is performed. On schema failure, the failing field is automatically removed from the data act.	For a selected data set, inspected record in the system and noted that when the data set was received from the VPN servers by the analytics pipeline, automated schema validation had been performed.	No exceptions noted.
	removed from the data set before being stored in the database.	For a selected schema failure, inspected the record in the system and noted that the failing field had been automatically removed from the data set before being stored in the database.	
C2.2.1	The networking applications do not contain log lines to prevent traffic source and destination being logged. Changes to this configuration are stored in version-controlled source	On a selection of days, inspected configuration of the network applications and noted that the networking applications had not contained log lines to prevent traffic source and destination being logged.	No exceptions noted.
	code, and failed unit tests automatically prevents merging of the code into the production branch should the word "log" appear in the configurations.	On a selection of days, inspected the version control system and noted that changes to networking applications had been stored in version-controlled source code and configured such that failing unit tests automatically disable merging of the code into the production branch should the word "log" appear in the configurations.	

C2.3.1	The TrustedServer analytics event data is configured to only include the date and to automatically generate a timestamp of 00:00:00.  The data analysis pipeline consumer filters the date field to convert the datestamp to an ISO formatted string without a time portion.	On a selection of days, inspected the configuration of the TrustedServer and noted that:  - the TrustedServer analytics event data had been configured to only include the date and to automatically generate a timestamp of 00:00:00.  - the data analysis pipeline consumer had filtered the date field to convert the datestamp to an ISO formatted string without a time portion.	No exceptions noted.
C2.3.2	Usage analytics are stored such that the length of a connection cannot be determined retrospectively. This is achieved via technical implementation to only store sanitized disconnect events, without any corresponding connect events.	On a selection of days, inspected the configuration of the technical implementation of the usage analytics system and noted that usage analytics had been stored such that the length of a connection could be determined retrospectively and only sanitized disconnect events, without any corresponding connect events had been stored  For a selected data event, inspected the record in the Usage Analytics System and noted that only sanitized disconnect event had been stored without any	No exceptions noted.

## 4.3.3. Control objective 3 – Third-party software as a service (SaaS) platforms

Controls provide reasonable assurance that ExpressVPN protects its customers from the compromise of ExpressVPN's selected third-party SaaS platforms involved in the TrustedServer build process.

Ref	Control activity specified by ExpressVPN	Tests performed by KPMG LLP	Results of testing
C3.1.1	A commit signed with an unauthorised key, or an unsigned commit results in the automatic disabling of the code change from being merged.	On a selection of days, inspected the configuration of the change management system and noted that it had been configured to automatically disable the code from being merged for commits with an unauthorised key, or unsigned commits.	No exceptions noted.
		For a selected commit, with an unauthorised key, inspected the change management system and noted that it had resulted in the automatic disabling of the code change from being merged.	
		For a selected unsigned commit, inspected the change management system and noted it had resulted in the automatic disabling of the code change from being merged.	

C3.2.1	Reproducible builds of the
	Operating System Image
	result in the following
	verification of multiple builds:

- automatically (crosschecked) by one side of the Continuous Integration System; manually by the Operations team before requesting release signing; and
- manually by the TrustedServer team before signing the image for release.

On a selection of days, inspected the configuration of the record in the system and noted that reproducible builds of the Operating System Image had resulted in multiple builds being verified:

- automatically (crosschecked) by one side of the Continuous Integration System;
- manually by the Operations team before requesting release signing; and
- manually by the TrustedServer team before signing the image for release.

No exceptions noted.

## 4.3.4. Control objective 4 – Individual VPN servers protection

Controls provide reasonable assurance that ExpressVPN protects its customers from the cross-compromise of any individual VPN server.

Ref	Control activity specified by ExpressVPN	Tests performed by KPMG LLP	Results of testing
C4.1.1	VPN Servers, Config Management, CDN and monitoring tools are configured at the firewall level to accept incoming management connections from specific ExpressVPN controlled sources, and to drop other connection requests.	On a selection of days, inspected the VPN Servers, Config Management, CDN and monitoring tools and noted that the system had been configured at the firewall level to accept incoming management connections from specific ExpressVPN controlled sources, and to drop other connection requests.	No exceptions noted.
		For a selected accepted incoming connection, inspected the record in the system and noted that the firewall level had been configured to accept incoming management connections from specific ExpressVPN controlled sources, and to drop other connection requests.	
C4.1.2	Authentication to VPN servers is performed using hardware-backed SSH keys, provisioned by a central IT team with known-good keys stored in a version-controlled repository.	On a selection of days for a selected authentication session, inspected the configuration of the system and noted that authentication to VPN servers had been performed using hardware-backed SSH keys, provisioned by a central IT team with known-good keys stored in a version-controlled repository.	No exceptions noted.
C4.1.3	SSH agent forwarding is disabled in the SSH configuration, which is maintained in version-controlled source code.	On a selection of days, inspected the configuration of the system and noted that the SSH agent forwarding had been disabled in the SSH configuration, which had been maintained in version-controlled source code.	No exceptions noted.

C4.1.4	A VPN server configuration does not record the details of other VPN servers.	For a selected server session, inspected the record in the system and noted that VPN server configuration had not recorded the details of other VPN servers.	No exceptions noted.
C4.1.5	Before a server enters production state, SSH access is automatically disabled by default.	On a selection of dates, inspected the configuration of the server and noted that SSH access had been automatically disabled by default before the server entered production state.	No exceptions noted.

## 4.3.5. Control objective 5 – Build pipeline protection

Controls provide reasonable assurance that ExpressVPN protects its build pipeline from dependency injection attacks.

Ref	Control activity specified by ExpressVPN	Tests performed by KPMG LLP	Results of testing
C5.1.1	The TrustedServer team maintain a version controlled repository of the versions and unique cryptographic hashes for external Python dependencies. The packages downloaded at build time are automatically verified against this repository of cryptographic hashes, with any mismatches resulting in failure to build.	On a selection of dates, inspected the configuration of the system and noted that the TrustedServer team had maintained a version controlled repository of the versions and unique cryptographic hashes for external Python dependencies.  For a selected package, inspected the record in the system and noted that:  - the packages downloaded at build time had been automatically verified against the repository of cryptographic hashes  - any mismatches had resulted in failure to build.	No exceptions noted.

C5.1.2	A third-party security scanning tool is configured to automatically and continuously validate Python and Ruby dependency files against known vulnerable versions, raising alerts should one be found.  If there are outstanding security alerts for dependencies, merging of new code will be automatically disabled and TrustedServer team subsequently resolves the outstanding security alert.	On a selection of dates, inspected the configuration of third party security scanning tool and noted that it had been configured to automatically and continuously validate Python and Ruby dependency files against known vulnerable versions, raising alerts should one be found.  For a selected outstanding security alert for dependencies, inspected the record in the system and noted that the merging of new code had been automatically disabled and the outstanding security alert had been resolved subsequently by the TrustedServer team.	No exceptions noted.
C5.2.1	The TrustedServer OS Image is built from open source repositories, with updates and security fixes automatically incorporated into each release of TrustedServer.	On a selection of days for a selected pull request, inspected the configuration of the system and record in the change management system and noted that TrustedServer OS Image had been built from open source repositories, with updates and security fixes automatically incorporated into each release of TrustedServer.	No exceptions noted.

C5.2.2	Third-party package source signatures are automatically verified against version-controlled, vendor published, GNU Privacy Guard (GPG) keys. These keys are maintained by the TrustedServer team as evidenced by the inclusion of keys alongside repository configuration in version-controlled source code.  An invalid or modified key results in automatic failure of OS build.	On a selection of days, inspected the configuration of the TrustedServer for a selected package, and noted that it had been configured to:  - automatically verify the third-party package source signatures against version-controlled, vendor published, GPG keys maintained by the TrustedServer team; - include the keys alongside repository configuration in version-controlled source code as evidence of signature verification; and - automatically fail the OS build for invalid or modified keys.	No exceptions noted.
C5.2.3	ExpressVPN provided Debian packages are cryptographically signed, with signatures validated at build time. A failing signature verification results in automatic build failure of the OS.	For a selected ExpressVPN provided Debian package, inspected the record in the system and noted that it had been cryptographically signed, with signatures validated at build time.  For a selected ExpressVPN provided Debian package, inspected the record in the system and noted that a	No exceptions noted.
		failed signature verification had resulted in automatic build failure of the OS.	

# 5. Other information

# Appendix - Glossary

Term	Description
Activator	A server that is responsible for setting sensitive credentials on target servers and set the target servers to a production ready state or close to production ready state.
Ansible playbook	A set of predefined instructions to be executed on target servers.
Booted OS	A running operating system.
Bootloader	A small program that loads the operating system into memory and boots (starts running) it.
Build system	A software system that takes source code as input and produces deployable artefacts, e.g. binary files, configuration files.
CDN	Acronym for content delivery network. It is a network of servers likely to be geographically close to the end users such that the data only needs to traverse a short distance and the response time is shorter as a result.
Cryptographic hash	A hash function is any function that can be used to map data of arbitrary size to fixed-size values. The values returned by a hash function are called hash values, hash codes, digests, or simply hashes. A Cryptographic hash is a hash where it is mathematically extremely difficult to deduce the original data from the hash and to find two data source that will result in the same hash.
Cryptographic signature	Using public and private key cryptography to help ensure data integrity and authenticity. One can use the signature to verify that the target data has not been tampered with and is signed by a specific entity.
CVE	Acronym for Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures. CVE are publicly available list of existing security flaws.
ISO image	A kind of computer filesystem format that is widely supported. It is commonly used for CD-ROM or operating system distribution.
Licensing counter	A software counter that counts concurrent logged in session against users' licenses.
Manual configuration	A means to connect to ExpressVPN VPN services without using the ExpressVPN client applications.

Operational metrics	Metrics that are useful for monitoring stability of servers, e.g. CPU usage, available RAM, network load, etc.
Orchestration tooling	A centralized tool for updating server configuration in a controlled and safe manner.
OverlayFS	A filesystem that stores changes and results of file system operation in RAM and not on hard disk or any device that persist data across boot.
PII	Acronym for Personally identifiable information. It is any data that can be used to identify an individual.
Production branch/Feature branch	A set of version of source code marked for production use (production branch) or development-in-progress (feature branch).
Ram-only infrastructure	Operating system that run entirely on RAM only, i.e. the hard disk is irrelevant and can be absent.
SSH	Acronym for secure shell. It is a protocol for secure remote login from one computer to another computer.
Version- controlled repository	Source code management system that records each changeset to the source code.
VPN server	Servers running our TrustedServer technology that handle the VPN traffic workload.
	User devices connect to our VPN servers and establish secure tunnels, i.e. the VPN tunnels, which encrypt the data passing through. The servers may be located in different countries/regions from the connecting users.
Yubikey	A hardware security device that allows the use of private key for encryption/authentication without the possibility of extracting the private key from the device.